INTRODUCTION
Bigamy and polygamy are perennial participants in the parade of horribles organized by opponents of LGBT rights. 2 To halt this parade, LGBT rights supporters argue that same-sex marriage is different from-and will not lead to-plural marriage. 3 The purpose of this advocacy is to open the door to marriage just enough to allow same-sex couples to enter-and then to quickly close the door before any of the participants in the parade of horribles can slip in behind them. Notwithstanding their efforts, it seems that LGBT rights supporters inadvertently left the door open just a crack.
If some commentators are correct, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may have unwittingly recognized plural marriage in its initial guidance 4 implementing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, 5 which struck down section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 6 According to these commentators, the IRS will now recognize any same-sex marriage that complies with the legal formalities of a state that permits samesex couples to marry, regardless of its validity in the couple's state of domicile. This interpretation put a foot in the door to marriage, swinging the door back open and creating the possibility of dual status marriages-that is, ones that are invalid under state law but
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THE IRS AND POLYGAMY 3 recognized for federal tax purposes-and thus to the potential recognition of plural marriage under the federal tax laws. This essay builds upon my earlier work analyzing the shortcomings of the IRS's implementation of the Windsor decision. 7 The Secretary of the Treasury promised that Revenue Ruling 2013-17 would provide "certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance" for same-sex couples. 8 To the contrary, I have explained that the ruling "provides no more than the same veneer of clarity that DOMA did, as it leaves important questions unanswered, lays traps for the unwary, creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and, hopefully, unintended) consequences."
9 Given the impossibility of finding a fair and workable solution for addressing the tax treatment of same-sex couples until same-sex marriage is recognized in every state, I have argued that the time is ripe to reconsider proposals to abandon the treatment of the married couple as a taxable unit in favor of an individual tax return filing system that recognizes and values all personal relationships. 10 In this essay, I extend that analysis by explaining how ambiguity in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 opens the door to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes-a result that is as problematic as it is (in all likelihood) unintended.
The remainder of this essay is divided into four parts. Part I summarizes the relevant section of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, explaining both my own interpretation of it and reaction to that interpretation (what I will refer to as the "alternative interpretation"). It is the alternative interpretation of the ruling that opens the door to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes. Part II explains how a subset of marriages that would be recognized for federal tax purposes under the alternative interpretation would be void under state law (until such time as the relevant state-level defense of marriage act is repealed or ruled unconstitutional), creating the possibility that taxpayers might (either purposefully or inadvertently) enter into plural marriages that are all recognized for federal tax purposes even though they are all invalid 7. Anthony C. Infanti under state law (and therefore avoid state criminal prohibitions against plural marriage). Part III dissects the flaws in the alternative interpretation. It explains why the alternative interpretation is unlikely to withstand scrutiny when challenged and how the inevitable challenges will only exacerbate the uncertainty that continues to surround the tax treatment of same-sex couples postWindsor. The essay then closes with brief concluding remarks.
I. REVENUE RULING 2013-17
From 1996 until 2013, section three of DOMA provided that, for purposes of federal law, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 11 The practical effect of this provision was to treat same-sex couples as legal strangers under federal law, even if they were treated as married under state law. For example, for federal tax purposes, same-sex couples who were married under state law (or who had entered into legally equivalent civil unions or domestic partnerships) were prohibited from filing joint federal income tax returns, 12 from transferring property to each other free of tax, 13 and from excluding from gross income the value of fringe benefits provided to a spouse. 14 On June 26, 2013, a sharply divided Supreme Court invalidated section three of DOMA. 15 The Court held that section three "is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity." 16 Following this decision, the federal government scrambled to issue guidance to 
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married same-sex couples on the application of federal law to their relationships. 17 Departing from its past practice of issuing to same-sex couples only guidance with no precedential value, 18 the IRS issued its first piece of guidance in the form of a revenue ruling. 19 The IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17 on August 29, 2013, with an effective date of September 16, 2013. 20 Among other things, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 purports to address the tax issues that mobile same-sex couples face as they grapple with a confusing patchwork of state laws governing relationship recognition. 21 As of this writing, states can be divided into four distinct (and sometimes overlapping) categories with regard to the legal treatment of same-sex couples: (1) those that permit same-sex marriage (e.g., the District of Columbia, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington), (2) those that recognize legally equivalent relationships (i.e., civil unions or domestic partnerships) (e.g., Nevada and the District of Columbia, which is also a jurisdiction that permits same-sex couples to marry), (3) those that recognize legal ("There are more than two hundred Code provisions and Treasury regulations relating to the internal revenue laws that include the terms 'spouse,' 'marriage' (and derivatives thereof, such as 'marries' and 'married'), 'husband and wife,' 'husband,' and 'wife.' "). NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 relationships with more limited rights and obligations as compared to marriage (e.g., Colorado and Wisconsin), and (4) those that refuse to legally recognize same-sex marriages (e.g., Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia-notably, Nevada, Colorado, and Wisconsin also fall into this category even though they afford some alternative form of legal recognition to same-sex relationships). 22 As they live in, move among, and travel between these states, married same-sex couples can divide their relationships into four distinct (and sometimes overlapping) categories:
• In an effort to dodge the complex and thorny issues created when mobility intersects with the patchwork of state relationship recognition laws, the IRS stated in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 that it "has determined to interpret the [Internal Revenue] Code [(Code)] as incorporating a general rule, for Federal tax purposes, that recognizes the validity of a same-sex marriage that was valid in the state where it was entered into, regardless of the married couple's place of domicile." 27 This statement seems simple and clear on its face; however, based on the explanation and justification of this position, the IRS appears to have had in mind only one of the four different categories of marriages described above. The IRS seems to have considered only the plight of same-sex couples in migratory marriages-that is, the IRS was concerned only with couples who lived and married in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage and who later moved to a state that refuses to recognize same-sex marriages. The IRS did not explicitly consider or address the legal situation faced by same-sex couples in evasive, visitor, or extraterritorial marriages. 29 Revenue Ruling 58-66 conveyed the IRS's position regarding common-law marriages, which, like same-sex marriages, are recognized in some states but not others. In Revenue Ruling 58-66, the IRS stated that it would recognize common-law marriages entered into in states recognizing those relationships and would continue to recognize those marriages in the case of taxpayers who enter into a "common-law marriage in a state which recognizes such relationships and who later move into a state in which a ceremony is required to initiate the marital relationship." 30 As described above, this is the very definition of a migratory marriage. In keeping with this focus on migratory marriages, the IRS recapitulated its position in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 regarding same-sex marriage as fitting neatly within the framework of Revenue Ruling 58-66: "For over half a century, for Federal income tax purposes, the [IRS] has recognized marriages based on the laws of the state in which they were entered into, without regard to subsequent changes in domicile, to achieve uniformity, stability, and efficiency in the application and administration of the Code."
31 The paragraphs following this recapitulation "reinforce the impression that the IRS only had migratory marriages in mind when it drafted the revenue ruling, as these paragraphs focus exclusively on the advantages of a uniform approach when couples change their domicile by moving from state to state."
32
Of particular relevance to this essay, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 leaves evasive marriages (i.e., where a same-sex couple marries outside of their home state to evade a same-sex marriage ban) entirely unaddressed. Other commentators disagree with this interpretation-notably, without engaging the text of the revenue ruling at all-and maintain that the IRS did intend to cover evasive marriages in Revenue Ruling 2013-17. 33 Even assuming that the IRS did intend to cover evasive same-sex marriages in Revenue Ruling 2013-17, there is still an open choice-oflaw question regarding whether, in the words of the ruling, each of these evasive marriages "was valid in the state where it was entered into," because only same-sex marriages meeting this requirement will be recognized for federal tax purposes. 35 The answer to this question will depend on whether the validity of the marriage is determined under the law of the place of the marriage's celebration (which does recognize same-sex marriage) or under the law of the couple's domicile (which does not). 36 As I will show in Part II below, this In considering whether evasive same-sex marriages are "valid" and thus recognized for federal tax purposes, the conventional choiceof-law rules found in the Restatement (First) and (Second) of Conflict of Laws might very well result in a court's decision to ignore the law of the place of celebration and instead to defer to the law of the samesex couple's domicile-that is, to the law of the state that does not recognize same-sex marriage. 38 Applying these rules, if the evasive marriage "violates the strong public policy" of the couple's state of domicile or is declared "void" by that state, then the marriage is invalid and should not be recognized for federal tax purposes under Revenue Ruling 2013-17. 39 
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THE IRS AND POLYGAMY 11 remainder of this essay, I will refer to this position as the "alternative interpretation" of Revenue Ruling 2013-17). 40 Under this alternative interpretation, all evasive same-sex marriages would be recognized for federal tax purposes, unless the state of celebration had enacted an "anti-evasion" statute that invalidated marriages entered into by couples attempting to evade prohibitions in their home state. 41 For instance, Massachusetts formerly had an anti-evasion statute that then-Governor Mitt Romney used to prevent some out-of-state samesex couples from marrying in Massachusetts. 42 New Hampshire still has an anti-evasion statute on its books. 43 In the next section, I will explore how the alternative interpretation might open the door to recognizing bigamous and polygamous same-sex marriages under the federal tax laws.
II. OPENING THE DOOR TO TAX POLYGAMY
The possibility that plural marriages might be recognized for federal tax purposes is created by the significant gap between what would be a novel federal standard for validating marriages and a separate, long-standing state standard for validating marriages. An example will help to illustrate how this gap between state and federal law might open the door to plural marriages, and it will also provide a vehicle for exploring the potential consequences of disconnecting state and federal law regarding the determination of marital status. For this purpose, I will use the example of a hypothetical same-sex couple from Pennsylvania-a state that only began to recognize samesex marriages on May 20, 2014. 44 Prior to that date, Pennsylvania was bordered on three sides by states that permitted same-sex couples to marry 45 and was in close proximity to others, which made entering into evasive marriages relatively easy. Our hypothetical Pennsylvania couple will be assumed to have traveled to New York to marry in late 2011 and to have returned to Pennsylvania after the wedding to make their home there. 46 This example will allow us to consider both: (1) how the gap between these federal and state standards for determining the validity of a marriage would have operated during the time that Pennsylvania refused to recognize same-sex marriages; 47 and (2) the potential implications following Pennsylvania's recognition of same-sex marriages for those who might have taken advantage of, or inadvertently fallen into, this gap. As discussed in Part II.D below, same-sex couples from Pennsylvania who entered into evasive marriages are not the only ones who might have taken advantage of, or fallen into, this gap. A similar gap continues to exist between the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and the standards for determining the validity of evasive same-sex marriages under the laws of several other states.
48
I will begin the discussion of this example by considering the legal treatment of the couple's evasive New York marriage prior to the time when Pennsylvania began to recognize same-sex marriages, analyzing its legal treatment first for federal tax purposes under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and then under state law. Following that discussion, I will consider the possibility that either or both members of this couple might have married additional-or alternative-same-sex partners and have had those marriages recognized for federal tax purposes, too. I will conclude the discussion of this example by considering the ramifications on such plural marriages of the recent federal court decision striking down the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act as unconstitutional. 
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A. Legal Treatment Before the Fall of the State Defense of Marriage Act
Federal Tax Treatment
Under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the Pennsylvania couple's New York marriage would be recognized for federal tax purposes from its inception so long as it was lawful in New York. Assuming for purposes of this discussion that the marriage did meet New York's legal requirements, the same-sex couple would have been treated as married for federal tax purposes from 2011 onward. In Estate of Lenherr, 52 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied this rule in determining whether a decedent's estate was entitled to the marital exemption under the state inheritance tax. Leo and Sarah Lenherr had been married for nearly forty years when Leo passed away. 53 Leo and Sarah had each been married before, and their former spouses had divorced them on the grounds that they had committed adultery (with each other). 54 Following their divorces, the Pennsylvania couple married in West Virginia and returned to 49 Pennsylvania to live. 55 The question in the case was whether the couple would be treated as married under Pennsylvania law at Leo's death, allowing property that was jointly owned by the couple with a right of survivorship to pass free of inheritance tax to Sarah. 56 It was conceded that the couple's marriage was valid under West Virginia law. 57 However, the couple had married in West Virginia to avoid a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited a husband or wife who was guilty of the crime of adultery from marrying " 'the person with whom the said crime was committed during the life of the former wife or husband.' " 58 A separate statute prohibited the issuance of a marriage license in Pennsylvania to an individual who was divorced on grounds of adultery and wished to marry the person with whom he or she had committed adultery. 59 Although Leo and Sarah had been divorced on grounds of adultery, neither had been convicted of the crime of adultery. 60 Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the adjudication of adultery in the context of Leo's and Sarah's divorces was sufficient to trigger both statutes. 61 This set up a direct conflict between Pennsylvania and West Virginia law and required the court to decide which state's law would apply for purposes of determining the validity of the couple's marriage. 62 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that there is a strong policy in favor of uniformity in the recognition of marriages but, at the same time, observed that each state has the authority to create its own marriage laws and "those laws and procedures should not be circumvented by the sham of travelling to a nearby less stringent jurisdiction." 63 In applying section 283 of the Restatement, the court had "no trouble concluding that Pennsylvania has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage." 64 The only real question for the court was whether the policy behind the 55 
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Pennsylvania statutes that prohibited the couple's marriage was "so strong that it must be given extraterritorial effect."
65
In considering this question, the court found "that the strength of the policy behind [the statute] depends to a significant degree upon the incident of marriage under consideration."
66 According to the court, an incidents-based analysis was appropriate because the legislature itself had provided that the statutory bar to remarriage by adulterers would not extend to all incidents of marriage. 67 The court determined that the policy behind the statutory bar was not to penalize the adulterers but to protect the sensibilities of their former spouses as well as the "'moral sense of the community.'" 68 Though the court admitted that the policy behind the statute might be "quite strong with respect to cohabitation and many other incidents of marriage," it concluded that denying the marital exemption from inheritance tax would neither deter adulterous conduct nor spare the feelings of the former spouses. 69 Balancing the "illusory gain" from enforcing the statutory bar against the purpose of the inheritance tax exemption to recognize that property held with right of survivorship is the product of joint effort as well as the policy in favor of uniformity in the recognition of marriages, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "decline[d] to apply Pennsylvania law to invalidate this marriage for this purpose." 70 Applying this analysis to the hypothetical New York marriage entered into by our Pennsylvania same-sex couple, the Pennsylvania courts would likely determine that Pennsylvania had the most significant relationship to the couple at the time of the marriage-a conclusion that would not only be consistent with Estate of Lenherr but also with other precedent applying the rule in section 283 of the Restatement. 71 The Restatement also explains that the first step in the analysis under section 283 (2) 73 the Pennsylvania General Assembly was more direct and categorical in both its invalidation of evasive same-sex marriages and its statement of the strength of the policy behind that invalidation. Before it was struck down as unconstitutional, the relevant portion of the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act read:
It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth. 74 Because the General Assembly declared this category of marriages "void" and clearly articulated a "strong and longstanding 72 . Id. Regarding the potential countervailing considerations that might exist, the Restatement explains:
The time of the bringing of the action which questions the validity of the marriage may have an important bearing upon whether a strong policy of the state of most significant relationship is involved. If the action is brought at a time when both spouses are still domiciled in that state, the interest of that state in the spouses is apparent and its strong policy may be involved in the circumstances discussed above. The situation may well be different, however, if the action involving the validity of the marriage is brought at a time when both of the spouses have moved from the state.
Id. (emphasis added). In the situation posited here, where the couple returns to and remains in Pennsylvania following the New York marriage, these countervailing considerations would not exist. See id.
73. Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 257, 258-59. Moreover, the Lenherr court's incidents analysis is not relevant to the instant situation because the General Assembly did not carve out any incidents of marriage from the statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage. See infra text accompanying note 744. The question here does not relate to whether it was inoffensive to treat a couple as married for a discrete purpose under state law; rather, it is whether the couple was married for all purposes under state law. Possessing one or more incidents of marriage is not sufficient for a couple to be treated as married for federal tax purposes. public policy" against same-sex marriage, it appears that an evasive marriage entered into by a Pennsylvania same-sex couple would have been held invalid prior to the fall of the state's defense of marriage act in May 2014. 75 Furthermore, a void marriage in Pennsylvania is a marriage that never existed at all-regardless of whether either party to the marriage ever sought an annulment. 76 Indeed, "[i]t has been held that, as a void marriage is a nullity, the innocent party is free to marry again without any prior decree of annulment."
77 Therefore, our hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple would have been left with a marriage that did not exist under state law but that would he disfavored form of marriage could not validly be celebrated in the forum state, and domiciliaries of the forum could not enter into that sort of marriage anywhere"); Strasser, supra note 39, at 337 ("Arguably, when a legislature declares a marriage void rather than merely prohibited, the state demonstrates that there is a strong public policy against such marriages and that such marriages, even if validly contracted elsewhere, should not be recognized by the state" (footnotes omitted)); see also supra note 39. 
B. Possibility of Plural Marriage
Given the invalidity of this evasive marriage and Pennsylvania's treatment of void marriages as nullities, it seems that nothing would have prevented this couple from entering into additional marriages. Two different scenarios come to mind in which the couple might have wished to enter into additional marriages:
• Serial monogamy. If the Pennsylvania couple ended their relationship following their New York marriage, they might have relied on the invalidity of their first marriage to enter into a later marriage (or marriages) with a new same-sex partner(s). The couple might have done this because they could not obtain a divorce from a Pennsylvania court, did not wish to establish residency in New York for at least one year to be able to divorce there, or did not want to incur the significant expense of hiring a lawyer to test the legal waters regarding the availability of an annulment in Pennsylvania. the relationship who had to pay for their own health insurance in order to add them to their employer-provided coverage on a tax-free basis. 80 It
83 Due to the invalidity of the New York marriage, neither of these subsequent same-sex marriages would have been bigamous at the time they were entered into. the New York marriage was. 85 Accordingly, from a state law perspective, none of these couples would have been considered "married" at all, let alone married multiple times. Yet, under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, all three of these marriages would have been recognized for federal tax purposes because all that would matter under that interpretation would be whether each marriage was permissible under the law of the place of celebration-regardless of its actual validity. 86 At first blush, it might seem odd that the state of celebration in each of these cases would be ignoring the prior marriage on the ground that it was invalid but then would be allowing one of the parties to that marriage to enter into another, similar marriage that was likewise invalid. But it would only be odd if the state were actually making a legal determination regarding the validity of these marriages prior to issuing a license. In practice, little or no legal vetting usually takes place before issuing a marriage license-a reality that is leveraged here by having the marriages take place in three different states. For example, when I emailed the New Jersey Department of Health to determine whether any legal vetting takes place in that state, I received the following response: "The local Registrars do not check any records to verify previous marriages when they take an application. The applicants sign the application to verify that they have provided honest and accurate information. 
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THE IRS AND POLYGAMY 21 the validity of a marriage are thus normally left to be sorted out sometime after the wedding day (hence many of the cases cited in this essay). Thus, whether our hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple entered into multiple marriages with the purpose of achieving legal recognition for an open relationship under the federal tax laws or merely to memorialize their serial monogamy, the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 would seem to treat the marriages the same. That is, all three of these marriages would be recognized for federal tax purposes and, in turn, our four Pennsylvania residents would be federally recognized bigamists or polygamists. Accordingly, the parties to these marriages would have been required to file plural joint federal income tax returns-a practically difficult task given that the joint return is designed to be filed only by those in dyadic marriages-or, if all of the parties were not agreeable to filing jointly (which is highly probable in the serial monogamy scenario), they would have been required to use the generally disadvantageous married filing separately status on their returns.
88
C. Ramifications of Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage
On May 20, 2014, a federal district court issued a decision striking down the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act on constitutional grounds-a decision with immediate effect that the Governor of Pennsylvania chose not to appeal. 89 Because at least one set of plaintiffs in the case had entered into an evasive marriage, 90 the court's ruling clearly addressed the legal treatment of same-sex marriages previously entered into outside of Pennsylvania and specifically conferred legal recognition on those relationships. 91 This legal development raises further interesting questions and issues regarding the interaction of state and federal law for couples who enter into multiple marriages, whether of the purposefully plural or JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 3, 2002, at B5 (reporting that one woman married two different men within months using two different identities). the serially monogamous variety. Again, the discussion of the legal treatment of these marriages will be discussed first for federal tax purposes under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and then under state law.
I.R.C. § § 1(a), (d), 6013 (West 2012
Federal Tax Treatment
Under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the court's decision should have been a nonevent for federal tax purposes. Under that interpretation, all that matters from a federal tax perspective is whether the state where a same-sex couple was married permitted same-sex marriages at the time. 92 Because all three of the states where the marriages posited in our example took place (i.e., New York, New Jersey, and Maryland) permitted same-sex couples to marry when the marriages were entered into, 93 all three of these same-sex marriages should have been, and should continue to be, "valid" and recognized for federal tax purposes under the alternative interpretation.
State Law Treatment
From a state law perspective, however, the retroactive application of the federal court decision could give rise to difficult legal issues. If all of these marriages were now retroactively afforded legal recognition, then Pennsylvania would now, too, see these individuals as having entered into multiple marriages. As a result, some or all of these four individuals might have committed the crime of bigamy. 94 There is, however, a defense to bigamy in Pennsylvania for those who enter into a subsequent marriage in good faith, which might protect the parties to these marriages from criminal prosecution. 95 Nevertheless, a deliberate attempt to enter into multiple marriages to take advantage of the gap that the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 creates between federal tax law and state family law (as occurred in the purposefully plural marriage scenario) might be seen as evidence of bad faith that would negate such a defense. 
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In terms of the legal validity of the multiple marriages posited in our example, the legal treatment under Pennsylvania law diverges significantly from the federal tax treatment under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. In keeping with its criminalization of bigamy, Pennsylvania permits only one marriage to be legally recognized at a time. 96 Depending on the facts and circumstances, the Maryland and New Jersey marriages might be retroactively void as bigamous, leaving only the New York marriage valid. 97 Alternatively, under appropriate facts and circumstances, the Maryland and New Jersey marriages might be legally recognized over the New York marriage. 98 But recall that if the validity of a marriage under the law of the state of domicile is irrelevant under Revenue Ruling 2013-17, as proponents of the alternative interpretation hold, then the invalidation of any of these marriages under Pennsylvania law should not affect their recognition for federal tax purposes. Thus, parties to multiple marriages-whether those marriages are purposefully plural or merely serially monogamous-could (or should) continue to file plural joint federal income tax returns-or be relegated to the disadvantageous married filing separately statusfollowing the federal court decision striking down the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act.
99
If our hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple were serially monogamous (rather than purposefully plural) in their marriages, then they might actually wish for the subsequent Maryland and New Jersey marriages to remain valid (rather than the initial New York marriage). A Pennsylvania statute could provide them with a partial remedy in this situation if the New York marriage is the only one that is otherwise to be legally recognized. marriage . . . and the subsequent marriage was entered into by one or both of the parties in good faith in the full belief that the former spouse was dead or that the former marriage has been annulled or terminated by a divorce, or without knowledge of the former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage has been removed by the death of the other party to the former marriage or by annulment or divorce, if they continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married from and immediately after the date of death or the date of the decree of annulment or divorce.
100
This statute provides only a partial remedy because the subsequent Maryland and New Jersey marriages could not be retroactively validated from their inception; rather, they would be valid only from the date the New York marriage ended through divorce or annulment. It would seem that, even under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the formal divorce or annulment of the first marriage should end its recognition for federal tax purposes-coincidentally, as of the same time the marriage would cease to be legally recognized under state law. However, as mentioned above, under the alternative interpretation, the Maryland and New Jersey marriages would have been recognized for federal tax purposes from the date of their celebration-and not just from the time the New York marriage ended through divorce or annulmentcreating yet further discontinuity between the federal tax and state law treatment of the same marriages.
D. Not Just a Pennsylvania Problem
This opportunity for purposeful legal arbitrage-or, alternatively, to inadvertently fall into a trap of legal complexity-is not unique to Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania is not the only state that has prohibited same-sex marriage, that has adopted rules similar to those in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws for determining the validity of marriages, and whose laws would allow same-sex couples to avoid criminal bigamy or polygamy charges because their relationships are legally invalid. 104. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (West 2014) (deeming same-sex marriages "prohibited and void"); id. § 402.040 (adopting a place of celebration rule for determining the validity of foreign marriages unless they are against public policy in Kentucky and specifying that same-sex marriages are against public policy); id. § 402.045 (declaring foreign same-sex marriages void in Kentucky); id. § 530.010(2) (providing that a reasonable belief that one is eligible to marry is a defense to a charge of bigamy); id. Thus, if the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 proves correct, then there are several other states whose laws appear to allow individuals to enter into plural marriages for federal tax purposes, whether purposefully or inadvertently.
III. A FLAWED INTERPRETATION
Adopting the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 might thus result in a profound reworking of the federal tax (indicating in appended commentary from the Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC, which is intended as an aid in construing the statute, id. § 500.100, that this reasonable belief defense aims to cover, among others, the situation where "the prior marriage was void"). 
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THE IRS AND POLYGAMY 27 treatment of intimate relationships. To be clear, I express no opinion here regarding whether plural marriage ought to be recognized for federal tax purposes. Rather, I am merely observing that adopting an interpretation that would lead to the recognition of plural marriage would represent a sea change in the tax treatment of intimate relationships. In this Part, I articulate the reasons why such a sea change in the tax treatment of intimate relationships is unlikely to withstand scrutiny and why it would do no more than add to the uncertainty that continues to surround the tax treatment of same-sex couples post-Windsor.
A. Contradictory Positions
The alternative interpretation would cause the IRS to espouse contradictory positions-in the same ruling-that both reify and undermine the importance of marriage in its conventional, dyadic form. Although Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is not without its internal contradictions, 107 these two positions stand in such stark contrast that they call into question the alternative interpretation's plausibility.
Reifying the importance of "marriage," Revenue Ruling 2013-17 takes a rigidly formalistic approach in determining which conjugal relationships qualify as "marriages" for federal tax purposes. In that ruling, the IRS-without any explanation or justification-announced that it would not treat same-sex or different-sex couples in civil unions or domestic partnerships as "married" for federal tax purposes.
108
This position came as a surprise because, just two years earlier, the IRS indicated its willingness to look past labels and to treat differentsex couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships as "married" for federal tax purposes so long as their legal relationships were equivalent to marriage under state law. 109 The IRS's newly rigid attachment to the label "marriage" effectively closes the door to Yet, embracing the alternative interpretation would undermine the importance of "marriage" in its conventional sense by opening the door to plural marriage. This would represent a radical departure from extant social norms concerning marriage, as expressed in state criminal prohibitions against bigamy.
111 Furthermore, in contrast to its position regarding civil unions and domestic partnerships, the IRS takes no explicit position on evasive (and, correlatively, plural) marriages in the ruling; rather, that position has only been inferred by commentators. 112 It is doubtful that a sea change in the legal treatment of intimate relationships would come about by implication, especially given the IRS's professed goal of providing certainty, clarity, and cohesive guidance to same-sex couples.
113 Moreover, it would be quite odd for the same ruling, on the one hand, to purposefully close the door to recognizing alternatives to conventional, dyadic marriage that already exist under state law and, on the other, to implicitly embrace an alternative to dyadic marriage that does not yet exist under state law (and that would not be correlatively recognized under state law following the fall of the individual state bans on same-sex marriage).
114
B. Too Far, Too Fast
Compounding the oddity of this juxtaposition of contradictory positions is the tax system's complete lack of preparedness to deal with plural marriage. As mentioned above, I express no opinion here regarding the propriety of legally recognizing plural marriage. My purpose is far more modest-that is, to observe that the IRS could not legally recognize plural marriage without making changes to the tax system to accommodate the differences between dyadic and plural marriage. whether it actually considered or understood the consequences of that position.
Through the Code, Congress imposes a federal income tax that applies at the national level; however, it is important to remember that the Code "taxes transactions whose legal effects are usually prescribed by state rather than federal law."
116 As a result, state family law underpins the federal tax treatment of intimate relationships.
117
But this underpinning falls short when it comes to plural marriage. Because plural marriage remains criminalized, commentators have not focused their energies on creating or refining a legal regime for its regulation. 118 To fill this gap, Adrienne Davis has considered what a regime for recognition and regulation of plural marriage might look like.
119 According to Professor Davis, family law is not equipped to deal with plural marriage and the ways in which it differs from dyadic marriage. 120 Instead, Professor Davis suggests that commercial partnership law could serve as a useful starting point for developing a regulatory framework for plural marriage. 121 Regardless, because family law is currently unequipped to deal with plural marriage, the Code lacks an underlying legal framework to which it can attach tax consequences.
Tax law is in no better position than family law to deal with plural marriage. As Samuel Brunson has observed, "tax law . . . has no mechanism for dealing with polygamous taxpayers."
122 The qualitative and quantitative differences between dyadic and plural marriage render our extant joint filing system, which treats the dyadic married couple as a taxable unit, ill-suited to the task of appropriately taxing plural marriages. 123 Of course, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 cannot address the lack of an underlying family law framework for dealing with plural marriage. Nor, for that matter, does it address the lack of a tax law framework for dealing with plural marriage. Had it done so, the IRS would have gone well beyond interpreting the Code. Adopting the alternative interpretation would therefore move the tax laws too far, too fastentering into uncharted territory that Congress and the states need to map before the IRS can address the tax treatment of plural marriage.
C. Validity of the Alternative Interpretation
The previous two sections make it clear that the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is both implausible and inadvisable because it opens the door to plural marriage. In response to these arguments, proponents of that interpretation might argue that the IRS never intended to legally recognize plural marriages, as evidenced by the lack of any mention of plural marriage in the ruling. But the same could be said of evasive marriages-the ruling makes no mention of this category of marriages either. 125 Nonetheless, proponents of the alternative interpretation assert that the IRS must have intended to cover evasive marriages in its guidance.
126 Such a conflicted interpretation of the ruling-reading coverage of one unmentioned type of marriage into the ruling while reading another unmentioned type of marriage out of the ruling-would be wholly untethered from the text. Far beyond mere interpretation, this would amount to a rewriting of the ruling-one that undermines the promise that the ruling would provide same-sex couples with certainty, clarity, and coherent guidance regarding their tax treatment.
127
As a fallback, proponents of the alternative interpretation might argue that the IRS had only dyadic marriage in mind when it drafted Revenue Ruling 2013-17. This argument is no better because it only draws attention to questions regarding the validity of the alternative interpretation. As described above, the alternative interpretation ' 
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THE IRS AND POLYGAMY 31 applicable state laws regarding the validity of marriages. To argue that couples who enter into these marriages may only have a single, dyadic marriage recognized for federal tax purposes-when these couples might, in fact, enter into a series of dyadic same-sex marriages because each of the dyadic marriages is void under state law-would merely impose a federal restriction on a category of federal tax marriages.
If the IRS were to embrace the alternative interpretation, taxpayers would very likely challenge it. These challenges could come from same-sex couples wishing to enter into plural tax marriages (if the IRS refuses them recognition), serially monogamous same-sex couples who wish to be freed from adverse consequences of the alternative interpretation, or, as I have explained elsewhere, from same-sex couples in evasive marriages that have broken down and who now find themselves trapped indefinitely in the highly disadvantageous married filing separately tax status because they are unable to sever their marital relationship under state or federal law.
128
As discussed below, when challenged, the alternative interpretation is unlikely to withstand scrutiny because of a combination of its implausibility, its inadvisability, and its creation of a federal tax law of marriage. Both litigation challenging the alternative interpretation and any ruling striking down that interpretation would serve only to darken the cloud of tax uncertainty hanging over same-sex couples post-Windsor. 134 is more appropriate. 135 In contrast, Kristin Hickman has argued that revenue rulings are eligible for Chevron deference because they can trigger the imposition of penalties and, therefore, have the force of law. 136 However, Professor Hickman has further argued that courts should nonetheless invalidate revenue rulings because the IRS issues them without satisfying the notice-andcomment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 137 Accepting Professor Hickman's analysis, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 should be invalidated in its entirety because the IRS failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when issuing the ruling. As discussed below, even following the conventional wisdom and applying Skidmore deference, the alternative interpretation should still be afforded no deference and should be rejected. Whichever approach is taken, the result will be to compound the uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of same-sex couples postWindsor.
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Skidmore Analysis
Under Skidmore, agency interpretations that are not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
138
More recently, the Supreme Court, citing Skidmore, stated that "[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position."
139 Professor Hickman, writing with Matthew Krueger, has helpfully suggested that these factors should be balanced with the overarching goals of Skidmore in mind; namely, "Skidmore's factors should . . . be understood as ferreting out two things: first, the extent to which agencies have deliberately employed their superior expertise and resources in evaluating the statutory ambiguity at hand; and second, the potential for arbitrariness in agency action." 140 Bearing this in mind, the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 should be afforded no deference under Skidmore because it smacks more of arbitrariness than of a reasoned application of agency expertise. It cannot be argued that the alternative interpretation demonstrates thoroughness of consideration or a high degree of care on the part of the IRS. As discussed above, it is unclear whether the IRS intended to cover evasive marriages in the ruling or even whether the IRS understood that this category of marriages exists at all. 141 How can the IRS be said to have engaged in a reasoned application of its expertise with regard to a position that was not clearly articulated and, to date, has only been inferred by commentators and others interpreting ambiguous language in the ruling? This is an especially difficult task when, in stark contrast, the IRS clearly articulated its position regarding migratory marriages, took care in explaining that position, and provided a reasoned justification of its choice of a place of celebration rule on administrability grounds.
142
The alternative interpretation also lacks any claim to consistency with earlier IRS pronouncements. The IRS cites its earlier position in Revenue Ruling 58-66 as evidence of a consistent position regarding the determination of a marriage's validity for federal tax purposes; however, as explained above, Revenue Ruling 58-66 did not address the treatment of evasive marriages. 143 Rather, it does no more than lend support to the argument that the IRS has taken a consistent approach in dealing with the separate question of how to determine the validity of migratory marriages. 144 Finally, the alternative interpretation lacks the power of persuasion. As discussed above, the alternative interpretation essentially creates a federal tax law of marriage-a law that would embrace the recognition of plural marriage for federal tax purposes.
145
Aside from an anomalous Second Circuit decision concerning the validity of an ex parte divorce (which the IRS has declined to follow), 146 a body of federal marital law wholly independent from state law. The real issue which this court must decide in the present case is not whether to apply state or federal law; it rather must decide which jurisdiction's law should be recognized where a judgment of one jurisdiction is adjudged to be without validity in the controlling taxation jurisdiction although concededly the first judgment would have been recognized and sustained in other jurisdictions."); Von Tersch v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 415, 419 (1967) ("For the purpose of establishing eligibility to file a joint Federal income tax return, the marital status of the Second Circuit's position, the Ninth Circuit emphasized some of the problems associated with adopting a federal tax law of marriage:
To provide a federal tax law of marriage would create greater confusion in divorce courts than now exists. Some individuals would be validly married for all purposes except federal taxes, and others validly married for federal tax purposes only. Marriage is peculiarly a creature of state law and we reaffirm . . . that state law governs.
148
As the discussion in Part II above amply demonstrates, the Ninth Circuit was, if anything, understating the potential problems and confusion created by a federal tax law of marriage. Under the alternative interpretation, marriages could be recognized for federal tax purposes when actually void under state law. Because of the invalidity of these marriages under state law, additional marriages could then be entered into for federal tax purposes, whether purposefully or inadvertently. When the relevant state ban on samesex marriage eventually falls, all of these marriages might then be recognized under state law as well, but either the additional marriages or the first marriage would likely be invalidated under state law to avoid a bigamous result-even though there might not be a corresponding termination of the marriage for federal tax purposes (or, if there is, the periods during which the various marriages would be legally recognized under state law might not match the periods during which those same marriages would be legally recognized for federal tax purposes). Furthermore, those taking advantage of this novel federal tax law of marriage might actually risk criminal prosecution for bigamy under state law following the fall of the state ban on same-sex marriage.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's observation that "[m]arriage is peculiarly a creature of state law" 149 highlights an additional problem with the alternative interpretation-namely, the federalism concerns that it raises. The alternative interpretation would create a federal tax two individuals is to be determined under the laws of the State of their residence."); Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 CB. 40, 40-41 (finding that, where a state court annulled a marriage and held that no valid marriage ever existed, the couple must file as single individuals for the year of the annulment and file amended returns for prior years); see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 1166, ¶ 111.3.6 ("There being no federal law of marriage and divorce (except in the District of Columbia), the marital status of taxpayers is usually governed by local law.").
148 150 Of course, the alternative interpretation is not motivated by anti-gay animus in the way that DOMA was. 151 But, in the case of evasive marriages, the alternative interpretation would directly interfere with a state's ability to determine the circumstances under which its own residents may marry, just as DOMA did.
152 Courts may eventually declare individual (and hopefully, all) state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional; however, it is beyond the IRS's authority to circumvent the legal process for reaching these decisions by creating a federal tax law of marriage that overrides and overleaps state law.
Unfortunately, a concomitant of these federalism concerns is tangible harm to same-sex couples. As I have explained elsewhere, same-sex couples would be adversely affected by the alternative interpretation if they find themselves trapped in a federal tax marriage with no way out after the relationship breaks down or when they are forced to deal with the complexities (and increased risk of audit) stemming from inconsistent federal and state tax treatment of their relationships while those relationships remain intact. 153 The alternative interpretation would also exacerbate class-based inequities within states that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage, as only those with the means to "evade" same-sex marriage bans would have access to marriage for federal tax purposes. 154 Furthermore, as mentioned above, if plural marriage were recognized for federal tax purposes, the alternative interpretation could expose the parties to marriages intended to take advantage of plural marriage to criminal sanctions under state law when the relevant state bans on same-sex marriage are repealed or declared unconstitutional and legal recognition is applied retroactively.
For all of these reasons, courts would owe no deference to the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. Indeed, given its lack of persuasive power, courts entertaining challenges to the 
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THE IRS AND POLYGAMY 37 alternative interpretation would likely reject it. While legal challenges to the alternative interpretation were pending, the level of uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of same-sex couples would naturally rise. Following the invalidation of the alternative interpretation, that uncertainty level would remain high because same-sex couples in evasive marriages would return to the status quo pre-Windsor, when the courts and the IRS provided same-sex couples essentially no guidance on the tax treatment of their relationships.
155
As I have explained elsewhere, deferring to state choice-of-law rules on questions of marital status is no panacea either, because that would have its own set of negative impacts on same-sex couples. 156 The point of my work in this area is not to advocate one or another set of rules that privilege certain marriages over others for federal tax purposes. Instead, the point of my work is to demonstrate the complexities and problems entailed by the choice in the tax laws to privilege one form of relationship (i.e., marriage) over all others. The problems entailed by this choice have long been known to tax academics. 157 The evolving legal landscape for recognizing same-sex relationships simply provides an opportunity to make these problems salient to a wider audience. Hopefully, we can seize this opportunity to move away from a discussion of how best to bring same-sex couples into the privileged fold of marriage and toward a conversation about how to achieve a tax system that respects all relationships equally.
158
CONCLUSION
Revenue Ruling 2013-17 has failed to deliver on the promise to same-sex couples of "certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance." 159 The ruling does not address-nor does it seem to fully appreciate-the complexities created by the intersection of mobility with the patchwork of state relationship recognition laws. Resulting ambiguity in the ruling has created the space for commentators to offer an interpretation of this ruling that would immediately expand the number of same-sex couples who could be treated as married for NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 federal tax purposes far beyond those married and residing in (or who formerly resided in) states that permit same-sex couples to marry. In addition to having potential negative effects on same-sex couples, this interpretation would open the door to legally recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes. From all appearances, it seems that this door was inadvertently left ajar rather than purposefully held open. The failure of the alternative interpretation to demonstrate any power to persuade is testament to the accidental nature of this radical expansion of marriage's privileged circle. However salutary it might be to expand the legal recognition of same-sex relationships and to break the hold that conventional marriage has had on the federal tax laws, the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is not the appropriate means of accomplishing these ends.
